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SESSION THREE: BOARD COMMITTEES
Session Three of the Colloquium focused on the committee system as an
organizational device to help the board of directors fulfill its responsibilities.
Commentators have cited a number of advantages in using the committee
system. First, because specific roles are assigned to the various committees, it is
likely that continuing attention will be paid for recurring problems. This is
preferable to making ad hoe responses in intermittent crises. Second, both the
company and the director are made aware of the fact that an important time
allocation has been made. Third, the operation of a committee makes it
necessary to institutionalize a flow of information to the board. Fourth, with a
committee system, it is possible to make use of the distinct abilities of
individual, outside directors. In plenary board meetings, a director tends to be
able only to react; in committee it is more likely that he can take personal
initiative.
Despite the advantages described in the literature, not all corporations have
adopted the committee system. A number of issues remain unresolved. Should
all public corporations be required by law to establish committees on their
boards of directors? Which committees should be required by law? Which
committees, though not required by law, should a corporation adopt? How
many directors should participate on each committee? How much compensa-
tion should directors receive for their participation on a committee? What is
the appropriate proportion of insiders to outsiders on each committee? What
should be the relationship between each comimittee, the board as a whole, and
the officers and employees of the corporation?
Professor Noyes Leech of the International Faculty delivered the keynote
remarks on board committees. Professor Leech first described the theoretical
models of board organization. He then explained the role of board committees
and presented an overview of U.S. practice, summarizing the legal require-
ments respecting board composition and board committees and reviewing the
types of committees presently used.
Prior to the Colloquium, members of the International Faculty submitted
brief summaries of board practices and the use of board committees in their
countries. Submissions by Misao Tatsuta (Japan), Barth~ldmy Mercadel
(France), Friedrich Kribler (Germany), Peter Lee (United Kingdom), and
Alain Hirsch (Switzerland) have been appended to Professor Leech's remarks.
Professor Leech:
This session focuses on committees of the board of directors. I will first put
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the question of committee function in the context of some theoretical models
of board organization. I then will describe the U.S. practice concerning board
committees and conclude by briefly mentioning the use of committees in the
United Kingdom, Japan, France, Switzerland and Germany.
The membership of the board of directors of a corporation generally fits one
of three models. The first is a board that is composed totally of insiders, i.e.
executive officers of the company. In the U.S. practice, public corporations no
longer fit this model, although it is not uncommon in smaller, privately held
corporations.
A second, more common, model is a mixed board of directors, composed of
executive officers, affiliated persons (such as the firm's investment banker,
lawyer, or a major stockholder who does not hold office), and possibly some
totally independent outsiders, directors who have no connection with the
company except for their status as a director. In this model, the board is
dominated by executive officers or other insiders.
A third model is the board dominated by outsiders. Although U.S. corpora-
tions have had outsiders sitting on boards of directors in the past, that has not
necessarily meant that the outsiders were exercising a particularly useful role
either as participants in decision-making or as monitors. In recent years, much
thought has been given to making outside directors more effective [1].
Regardless of whether a corporation has an inside board, a mixed board
with insider dominance, or an outside-dominated board, the question still
remains of how the board should function. The board may act in a variety of
different ways. It may serve purely in a formal way, "rubber stamping" what
the executive officers have already decided. It may go beyond that to exercise
an advisory role, contributing to the executive officers its insights and its
particular expertise in accounting, law, engineering, or banking. The board also
may actively participate in managerial decisions, in fact working on day-to-day
managerial problems. Another possibility, of course, is the monitoring board,
the one that was described by Professor Mundheim in Session One. This type
of board engages in review and surveillance; in effect, requiring the executive
officers to account to it.
Although I have described discrete models of board function, in reality a
board may fulfill more than one of these roles. For example, a board may
advise the chief executive officer, may actively participate in some managerial
activities, and concurrently may monitor the executive officers' management of
the corporation. In a large publicly owned corporation, however, boards
generally cannot effectively participate in day-to-day management. It is im-
portant to remember that in the major corporations of any country, decisions
on day-to-day operations are necessarily made by a limited group. Given this
basic managerial fact, the issue arises: How should the board be organized in
order to make the individuals who actually run the business accountable for
what they do? There are a number of questions involved in focusing on the
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matter of board organization. Included among these questions is whether a
director should be considered an insider or outsider. If the board is to have
members whose major function is to call executive officers to account, what is
needed are people who are independent of those officers. Using the phrase
"outside", however, does not totally answer the question because some out-
siders may have connections with the corporation that make them more or less
dependent upon it. These persons may include the corporation's general
counsel or investment banker. Additionally, other outsiders may be less than
fully independent because of friendships with inside members of the board or
management or because, although they have retired from management, they
retain personal loyalties to the present executive officers.
Additional questions include the frequency with which the board of direc-
tors meets, the character and timing of information that is available to the
board, and the level of compensation for work on the board. With regard to
the last question, compensation should strike a balance between the expecta-
tion that a director should devote a substantial amount of time to the
corporation and the need of a director to retain his independence.
The final question with respect to making management accountable is the
use of board committees [2]. The board committee is used increasingly in the
United States. It may be described as a small group of the board that focuses
on specific tasks and makes decisions or recommendations that are then
presented to the entire board. Board committees may differ with respect to
their membership, selection criteria, proportion of insiders to outsiders, and
their level of functioning within the corporation (i.e. active decision-making at
the management level, advising and/or monitoring).
I would now like to present an overview of the U.S. practice, first discussing
the legal requirements concerning the composition of the board and board
committees. In the United States, there are two levels of law applicable to the
corporation. Corporations are organized under the laws of the individual
states; each state has its own legislation governing the structure and operation
of corporations. Overlaid upon this state law is a body of federal law, most of
which grew out of the Great Depression and was enacted during the adminis-
tration of Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s. The principal statutes are the
Securities Act of 1933 [3] and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [4]. These
statutes are aimed primarily at the issuance and trading in securities, but some
portions of these statutes must be considered in dealing with the composition
of the board of directors. In addition to state and federal law, those companies
that are listed on a stock exchange are subject to the rules of the relevant
exchange. There is no state or federal law that requires that corporations have
outside directors on their boards and, with one exception, there is no state or
federal law that requires board committees (the law of the state of Connecticut
provides that a corporation with one hundred shareholders must have an audit
committee [5]). The New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
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Exchange require that listed companies have at least two outside directors. A
company cannot be listed on the exchange unless it already has two outside
directors or unless it agrees to put outside directors on the board within a short
period of time [6]. The New York Stock Exchange also has a rule that
companies listed with the exchange must have an audit committee [7]. The
exchange does not define the role of the audit committee. That is something
that has been left to the individual company to work out on a case-by-case
basis, although it is required that the members of the audit committee be
independent.
Finally, the Securities and Exchange Commission has a set of rules dealing
with proxies [8]. The Proxy Rules provide that a corporation that goes to its
shareholders to solicit their proxies for a meeting must issue a document, called
a proxy statement, describing the matters to come before the meeting. In
particular, the corporation that solicits proxies with respect to the selection of
directors must provide certain information about the nominees. The rules
mandate that the proxy statement contain information about the relationship
between the corporation and the nominees, concerning, inter alia, family
relationships and close business relationships, such as the relationship between
the company and its investment banker or lawyer. Although the SEC does not
require that a company set up any specific committees, it does require
disclosure in the proxy statement concerning whether a company has audit,
nominating, or compensation committees. This disclosure rule may tend to
cause a company to set up such committees, since proper industry standards
may be thought to require them and a company may not want to reveal that it
is not living up to such standards.
Let us now look at some statistics about the composition of boards of
directors, some of their practices and the use of committees. Korn/Ferry
International, an executive search organization, publishes annual studies of
boards; I will refer to their statistics in the discussion that follows [9]. Their
figures for 1981 reveal that in major U.S. corporations, outsiders predominated
on boards of directors. In that year, the average number of directors on boards
was thirteen, of whom nine were outsiders, although the number of "outsiders"
must be qualified somewhat since that designation in the Korn/Ferry figures
includes people who were formerly employees of a company. These statistics
disclose that boards met, on the average, eight times a year for an average
number of hours of one hundred and twenty-three. The hourly figure works
out to about two days a month. The most common practice with respect to
compensation is the provision of a combination of an annual fee plus a
per-meeting fee. Annual compensation on that basis in 1981 was $15,660.
Board committees are in very general use in U.S. corporations. The commit-
tees most commonly found are the executive committee, the audit committee,
the compensation committee and the nomination committee. There are other
committees that are less frequently used: the finance committee, the public
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affairs committee, the corporate ethics committee, the planning committee, and
the benefits committee, for example.
The executive committee carries on a variety of tasks for the board when the
board is not in session, making definitive decisions in some cases and, at other
times, making decisions to be ratified at a later board meeting. The Korn/Ferry
statistics indicate that membership on executive committees was shared equally
by insiders and outsiders during 1981. Outsiders predominated on the three
other major committees.
As its name indicates, the audit committee is concerned primarily with the
work of the outside auditor of the company [101. You might well ask: "Why
have a special committee of the board if the corporation has already hired an
outside auditor to go over the company's books?" There are two major reasons.
First, someone has to hire the auditor and, second, someone has to spell out
the auditor's job. Thus, one of the principal tasks of the audit committee is to
guarantee that the independent public accountant hired to do the audit is in
fact really independent of management. The second principal task of the audit
committee is to see to it that the auditor fully understands the scope of his
audit and that that scope is not unduly restricted by the management. There is
no formal general assignment for every auditor for every audit. An auditor can
go to various depths in his audit and make various tests. He may count
inventory in one part of a company one year and do it in a different part
another year. He may make certain spot checks, or he may make absolute
counts. Somebody has to designate what tasks are to be performed, i.e. to
define the scope of the audit. The audit committee, a group independent of the
management whose work is to be audited, defines that scope. Beyond these
major tasks of selecting the auditor and defining the scope of the audit, audit
committees are also frequently charged with reviewing the audit before it is
published. Some audit committees are also charged with subsidiary tasks, such
as reviewing the corporation's conflict of interest policies. The Korn/Ferry
statistics disclosed for 1981 that the average number of members of audit
committees was four and that they were all outsiders. The fact that these
committees are made up of outsiders is important. The audit committee is the
only one required of N.Y. Stock Exchange listed companies. It is a place where
the outside directors can meet to talk with each other about the corporation's
problems as they see them, problems they may not yet be prepared to bring to
the full board. Committee membership affords them an opportunity to share
their hopes and concerns about the company in a private way. In 1981, audit
committees met an average of three or four times a year; the average payment
per member for each meeting was $510.
The compensation committee is concerned primarily with the compensation
of the top executive officers [11]. Its principal charge is to approve or
recommend the approval of the compensation for the chief executive officer
and for other leading executive officers. Some compensation committees are
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charged with other responsibilities as well, such as reviewing the company's
stock option plan, engaging in management development programs, and rec-
ommending the compensation for outside directors. The executive officer is
excluded from formal committee activity, but usually makes recommendations
with respect to the compensation of executive officers at the top level. This
committee has an average of four members, generally all of whom are
outsiders. In 1981, the committees met an average of four times annually and
each member received approximately $500 per meeting.
The nominating committee is used less frequently than the audit committee
and the compensation committee in U.S. corporations. The SEC has encour-
aged corporations to use this committee, however, and an increasing number of
corporations are doing so. There is no consensus among corporations as to
what the role of this committee should be, or even whether there should be
one. Those committees that do exist deal primarily with the following prob-
lems: qualifications for board membership; nominations to fill board vacancies
between meetings of the shareholders; and nominations of the annual slate of
candidates. Collateral responsibilities may include establishing criteria for the
composition of the board (i.e. the proportion of insiders to outsiders) and
recommending the successor to the chief executive officer [12]. The average
number of members on nominating committees is five, usually with one insider
(generally the chief executive officer) and four outsiders. In 1981 the commit-
tee met an average of twice a year and compensation per member was around
$490 per meeting.
I would now like to mention briefly examples of practice in other countries
with respect to board composition and committees. Professor Tatsuta relates
that insiders predominate on Japanese boards, although some outsiders also
serve. The boards, by law, are supposed not only to manage but also to
monitor, although more attention is paid to the management role. Committees
in Japanese corporations are not particularly well organized. There are, for
example, no audit committees. One development, the increase in the powers of
the supervisor, however, suggests that Japanese law is paying more attention to
the monitoring role.
I will not elaborate on the picture that Mr. Bauer gave us of France, except
to suggest that a monitoring role for the board has not developed and that
committees of the board do not seem particularly well organized. The United
Kingdom system has developed a growing interest in the use of outside
directors. In Germany, the Aufsichtsrat is the prototype of a monitoring board
and one would think that the monitoring role is well developed there. We are
told by our German colleagues, however, that the Aufsichtsrat is really too
large to engage in effectively monitoring the acts of the executive officers.
Swiss practice is to appoint one major committee with significant monitoring
responsibility. These various practices are described in greater detail in an
appendix to this paper, in letters solicited from members of the International
Faculty.
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In the United States, committees of the board have become useful tools in
the development of boards that monitor managements. In other legal systems,
other devices will certaifily be tried. But if monitoring is to become a major
board function, a conscious decision must be made, by legislatures or at the
level of the corporation itself, to assign that role to the board and to organize
the board to carry it out. Action must be taken to produce a monitoring board.
It will not happen by itself.
Appendix: Descriptions of board practices by members of the International
Faculty
Japan: Misao Tatsuta
(1) The board of directors is supposed both to manage and to monitor the
management. This has been so since the 1950 amendment which introduced
the board system modeled after the American law. The 1981 amendment
explicitly provides to this effect. Commercial Code art. 260 para. 1.
Certain enumerated matters and other "important" matters must be de-
cided by the board itself, i.e. they may not be delegated to other bodies.
Commercial Code art. 260 para. 2.
Around 1975, in the early stage of revision discussions that led to the 1981
amendment, the Ministry of Justice suggested the introduction of outside
directors. This attempt, however, was given up because of the difficulty in
getting proper persons. Instead, the bill further strengthened the supervisor
(kansayaku) system along the lines of the 1974 amendment.
(2) In large corporations it is common to have one or more committees
within the board. Usually the board simply rubber stamps what a committee
has decided.
The same is true with regard to the board's monitoring function. However,
when it comes to an extreme situation, the board does wield its power. For
instance, the board of the largest department store recently removed its
president who, although extremely powerful, had committed misconduct.
(3) Most board members are employees or ex-employees. The American
notion of "officers" corresponds to that of "representative directors" (daihy5
torishimariyaku) under Japanese law. Representative directors are appointed
from among the directors. In many corporations, a few members of the board
are persons from other corporations, mostly from the same group. Some of
them are delegated by the lead bank.
(4) As stated in (2) above, it is a common practice to have board commit-
tees. I am not sure, however, whether these committees are functioning as a
means for the board to inform itself. At any rate, there is no audit committee
within Japanese boards.
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The statute requires that the representative directors report to the board
about what is going on at least once every quarter per year. Commercial Code
art. 200 para. 3. This provision was added by the 1981 amendment. But even
before then it was considered the representative directors' duty to report to the
board. It is a common practice for the board to hold monthly meetings. Also,
representative directors must convene an extraordinary meeting whenever an
urgent problem comes up.
(5) Before the 1974 amendment, a supervisor was empowered to audit
company accounts. At that time many supervisors were persons of. second
class, such as those who reached the age limit as employees, but were regarded
as not talented enough to be a director.
The 1974 amendment changed the situation in large and medium corpora-
tions. Supervisors now have the power to request an injunction, to attend the
board meeting, and to bring several kinds of actions. Since the amendment,
many corporations have appointed important persons as supervisors. It is
becoming more and more common that the supervisor has his own staff.
The 1981 amendment took a further step. The supervisor is now obligated
to report to the board about directors' misconduct, and he is empowered to
convene a board meeting for that purpose. Commercial Code art. 260-3 paras.
2 through 4. Moreover, a large corporation must have at least two supervisors,
and one of them must be full time.
I would assume that many supervisors are performing their function in
accordance with the statute. Otherwise, they would be held liable for large
damages, jointly and severally with the directors.
France: Barth&kmy Mercadal
The movement toward active monitoring or supervisory boards
In private companies, Ghertman's study demonstrates that in certain cases
there is active intervention by the board of directors, or at least by certain of
its members. The study by Bauer and Cohen, however, asserts that real power
belongs to the president who organizes a team around himself from which a
successor emerges; the board of directors has only a very limited role in the
choice of officers; the board tends to become a mere "rubber stamp"; in the
extreme case, it does not even exercise supervisory functions.
This is the role that has been assigned to the boards of some companies that
have been nationalized since 1946. However, in the case of recent nationaliza-
tions, attempts have been made to restore the board to a position of effective
management. The most striking position is taken by the CGT (a labor union
that is communist oriented and close to the PCF, the French Communist
party) which claims that the board of directors should be very active. This
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position collides with a principle of company law to which nationalized
companies are subjected unless an express exception applies. This principle
(the so-called principle of the hierarchic organization of corporations) forbids
each organ of the company (president, board of directors, shareholders) from
encroaching upon the powers that the statute confers on the other organs.
Since the statute confers on the president the management of the company, it
is inferred that the board of directors cannot intervene in the conduct of the
company's business by taking charge of its management. Thus, the Cour de
Cassation in one case annulled a very severe restriction that a board of
directors had imposed on the powers of a president. Nevertheless, in spite of
that example, it is not possible to state where "management" ends and
"direction" begins.
Practice of the board of directors
In France, only the board of directors can set up committees of inquiry. The
board has complete liberty to determine the composition of committees.
Members of committees may be, but need not be, directors or shareholders.
Also, the board determines a committee's charge, which must be limited to
inquiries. Moreover, committees can play only an advisory role. Within the
jurisdiction of each committee, questions to be considered can be submitted
either by the board of directors or by the president.
In practice, the advantage of these committees is often to allow the payment
to directors of supplementary compensation, because the statute authorizes
exceptional compensation for separate and occasional tasks.
Furthermore, there are no rules with respect to voting procedures within the
board of directors. There occassionally arise questions on that subject: for
example, can a single member of the board be given a veto right?
Germany: Friedrich Ktbler
In the following paragraphs I shall cite our Aktiengesetz (stock corporation
law) the way we normally do in Germany (§ = art.; roman figures stand for
sections; S. = Satz = sentence).
Your basic assumption that "outside directors" can best be compared to the
Aufsichtsrat (AR) is correct. Hiring and supervising the Vorstand (V =
managing board) are the main responsibilities of the AR (see §§ 84 I and 111
I). Apart from the workers' representatives, the members of the AR are elected
at the shareholders' meeting (§ 10) and at any time can be removed by a
three-fourths majority (§ 103 I).
(1) The (nonworker) members of the AR should be "outsiders" in the sense
that they are not institutionally dependent on the V. For this reason:
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- they cannot be a member of V or a top executive of the corporation (§ 105 1). But a retired
member of V can be elected as a member of AR (in our big banks the chairman of V after retiring
often becomes chairman of AR);
- a member of V of A corporation cannot become a member of AR of B corporation if B
"dominates" A, for instance, by holding a majority of shares (§ 100 II No. 2);
- a member of V of A corporation cannot become a member of AR of B corporation if a member
of V of B corporation already holds a seat in the AR of A corporation (§ 100 II no. 3).
Employees other than top executives are not formally excluded from the
AR. (The general in-house counsel would often be a top executive.) But
normally the AR of a public corporation is composed of top managers of other
big companies. Practicing lawyers may be found on the AR of a close
corporation (representing owners being their clients) but only recently on the
AR of a public corporation.
(2) In order to perform its task of supervision, the AR has access to the
books kept by the corporation and to other sources of information (§ 111 II S.
1). The AR can ask individual members or hired experts (accountants) to
collect this information (§ 111 II S. 2). The Vorstand has to report regularly to
the AR (for details see § 90 1 and II). The AR can ask for additional reports at
all times (§ 90 III S. 1). Even an individual member of the AR can ask for
more information, although the V can refuse to give it if the demand is not
supported by at least one other member of the AR (§ 90 III S.). Section 107-Il
authorizes the AR to form permanent or ad hoc committees. Their main
functions are to help the AR to make decisions (e.g. the nomination of new
members of V and the evaluation of risks connected with big loans made by
banks). As the AR as a whole (apart again from workers' representatives) is
conceived to be "outside" the corporation, these committees do not seem to
have the same importance as in the United States. Of course, the AR normally
is much too large to adequately perform the supervising function. Very often
the main responsibility remains with the chairman of the AR (e.g. in the banks
he is informed daily and therefore resides inside the main office).
United Kingdom: Peter Lee
I believe that much more is now made of nonexecutive directors by U.K.
public companies than was the case five years ago. There is a general feeling
that boards should include a number of them and their inclusion in boards is
gradually becoming more common. I also believe that there is a realization that
they should be people with something worthwhile to contribute; that these
nominations should not merely be a case of "jobs for the boys" or nepotism as
perhaps has sometimes been so in the past.
I think that the use of board committees is probably on the rise; e.g. the
audit committee which a number of larger companies have created. Board
committees remain a key feature in certain areas; e.g. in the case of a tender
offer a board committee is almost always appointed to deal with the matter.
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Switzerland: Alain Hirsch
(1) Swiss public corporations do in fact appoint outside directors. Formally,
they are really outside* and unaffiliated directors. In fact, they are often
directors or managers of other important Swiss companies, lawyers, members
of the Swiss Parliament or other public bodies, university professors, etc.
Indeed, these people would very often be the majority of the directors in
important Swiss companies.
(2) Normally, in an important company the board of directors would
appoint one committee only. On average, this committee would meet probably
once a month. This committee generally is a "monitoring" committee and not
a management committee. However, it also may make some important deci-
sions upon delegation by the board or assist the board in making decisions.
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